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INTRODUCTION
In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court held that the
state has, in the context of abortion, a compelling interest in a viable
fetus.' This interest allows the state to proscribe most post-viability
abortions, save those situations where the pregnant woman's life or
health is endangered. In those instances, the pregnant woman re-
tains the right to make all health care decisions, including the right
to abortion. Roe was extraordinary because it expanded women's
autonomy by allowing women to control one of the most life chang-
ing events-whether and when to bear children. Control of this ma-
jor life function, previously depoliticized as solely a private activity,
was considered a leap forward in women's ability to engage in the
public sphere of work and politics. With the legalization of abortion,
women were better able to defer motherhood and marriage in order
to engage in education and work.2 In this way, it was believed that the
holding in Roe opened one of the doors to the legal protection of
women's autonomy that had previously been nailed shut, and in do-
ing so, Roe would assist in expanding women's citizenship beyond its
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410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973).
2 Cf ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE,
SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 111 (1984) ("[T]he totality of these conditions adds
up to a situation in which more women are spending more years of their lives outside marriage
and without direct dependence on men, focused on activities other than domesticity and child-
rearing."); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1017 (1984)
("[R]estricting access to abortion dramatically impairs the woman's capacity for individual self-
determination."). However, access to abortion continues to be restricted for many women as a
result of their poverty and the constitutionality of state and federal denials of funds for abor-
tion. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment re-
stricting federal funds for abortions for indigent women); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977) (holding that states need to allocate funds to pay for abortions for indigent women).
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historical second-class status.3 As Rosalind Petchesky notes, changes
concomitant with the Court's decision in Roe also occurred in
women's social and political status. These changes included a "new
range of social conditions that redefined the terms of a 'normal life'
for women. 5  Even the Court, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, took
note of the importance of abortion to women's equality, stating that
"[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control
their reproductive lives."6
Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly, Roe's holding has in some
ways led to the derogation of women's choices, women's autonomy,
and, consequently, women's citizenship. Courts have used the Su-
preme Court's holding in Roe, articulating the state's compelling in-
terest in a viable fetus, outside of the abortion context to proscribe
pregnant women's health care decision making.8 For example, both
state and federal courts allow treatment of pregnant women when
3 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 184 (1989)
("Liberals have supported the availability of the abortion choice ... usually on the implicit view
that reproductive control is essential to sexual freedom and economic independence.");
PETCHESKY, supra note 2, at 292 (arguing that the decision in Roe genuinely reflected a progres-
sive liberal climate, which viewed abortion as a fundamental right).
4 PETCHESKY, supra note 2, at 116.
5 Id.; see also Law, supra note 2, at 981 ("Nothing the Supreme Court has ever done has been
more concretely important for women.").
6 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
7 In fact, several commentators have surmised that Roe's holding has led to the increased,
and increasingly violent, anti-choice protest, like those supported by Operation Rescue. See,
e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63
N.C. L. REV. 375, 385-86 & n.82 (1985) ("Heavy-handed judicial intervention was difficult to
justify and appears to have provoked, not resolved, conflict.").
8 See, e.g., Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1251-
52 (N.D. Fla. 1999) (holding that the decision in Roejustified a state court's order compelling a
woman to submit to a cesarean section delivery of a baby instead of normal delivery) ; Jefferson
v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. 1981) (ruling that the state's
interest in protecting a viable fetus justified compelling a woman to undergo a cesarean section
delivery of her baby); In reJam. Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899-900 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding
that the state has a significant interest in protecting the life of a midterm fetus which outweighs
a patient's right to refuse a blood transfusion). In addition, I believe that Roe's holding has also
been misused by legislatures in formulating living will and health care proxy statutes that in-
clude "pregnancy clauses" invalidating a woman's living will or health care proxy when she is
pregnant. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.04(c) (Michie 2002);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06 (B) (Anderson 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-70 (Law. Co-op.
2002). As a result of these statutory exemptions, terminally ill, comatose pregnant women are
kept alive against their articulated desires because the state forces them to gestate their fetuses,
regardless of their own health circumstances and health care choices. Hence, in these circum-
stances, the state denies women the ability to control their end-of-life health care. Although the
legislative history of these statutes is slim, these statutes have a similar effect asjudicial decisions
compelling medical treatment. The statutes put the life of the fetus before the health care de-
cision making power of the pregnant woman, thereby diminishing her autonomy and hence
citizenship in much the same way as the judicial decrees.
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such treatment is believed to be in the best interest of the fetus.9 The
use of Roe in this context severely restricts the decisional and physical
privacy of individual women, and works to severely limit the citizen-
ship of women as a social group. By derogating women's privacy, and
hence their autonomy, and in so doing, subordinate all women to
their potential reproductive role. Simply put, these decisions man-
dating treatment, require women to sacrifice their autonomy, while
men do not suffer a similar restraint.'° In this way, women's citizen-
ship status is inferior relative to the citizenship status of men.
In this Essay, I demonstrate how I have come to the conclusion
that the "compelling state interest" language used by the Court in Roe
has been used to constrain and derogate women's citizenship. In
Part I, I detail Roe's holding and describe some of the arguments,
which use Roe as precedent, that seek to justify limits on health care
decision making by pregnant women. I argue that because Roe does
not address situations outside of the abortion context, it leaves intact
women's common law and constitutional liberty rights to direct their
medical care. Therefore, the state cannot constitutionally compel
medical treatment on pregnant women for the sake of their fetuses.
In Part II, I detail some of the ways in which Roe has been used to
harm women. Specifically, I argue that judicially compelled medical
treatment harms individual women because it violates the privacy and
liberty interests of individual women to engage in pregnancy-related
decision making and other medical decisions.
Finally, Part III elucidates the fundamental harm that lies at the
heart of these restrictions-the consignment of women to second-
class citizenship. In this section I argue that judicially compelled
medical treatment in this context harms women as a social group by
subordinating all women to their reproductive capacity and state-
sanctioned mothering roles. I also argue that such treatment dimin-
ishes women's autonomy and by so doing, derogates and disrespects
women's claim to full citizenship. These harms, along with the harms
to individual women, have the effect of relegating women to second-
class citizenship.
9 I have previously explored issues regarding judicially compelled medical treatment of
pregnant women in other contexts, particularly focusing on the way in which such treatment
violates the common law and constitutional rights of individual women. April L. Cherry, The
Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant Women Who Refuse Medical Treatment, 69 TENN. L. REV. 563 (2002);
April L. Cherry, Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, The Social Construction of Maternal Deviance, and Some
Thoughts About Love and Justice, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 245, 249-52 (1999).
t0 See Donald H. Regan, Rewiting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1583 (1979) (noting
that the burdens imposed upon parents are not physical burdens that entail the loss of a par-
ent's physical autonomy); cf In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614, 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (denying
adoptee's access to adoption records needed in order to determine whether the birth father
was an appropriate donor); McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978) (refusing to compel
the only compatible donor, a cousin, to donate bone marrow to a dying man).
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I. ROE AND RESTRICTIONS ON PREGNANT WOMEN'S
MEDICAL DECISION MAKING
Roe v. Wade" is perhaps the most important case decided by the
United States Supreme Court furthering women's autonomy, equal-
ity, and hence citizenship, in the twentieth century. Thirty years ago
the Supreme Court, in invalidating a Texas statute criminalizing
abortion, made three important declarations: (1) a woman's right to
abortion is protected by the right to privacy; (2) the state has an
"important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of
human life,"' 3 which allows the state to regulate and even prohibit the
abortion of a viable fetus;' 4 and (3) the state's compelling interest in a
viable fetus cannot override a woman's abortion decision where the
abortion was "necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother."' 5
Roe's declaration, regarding the compelling nature of the state's
interest in a viable fetus, has been used as a justification for states to
force nonconsensual medical treatment on pregnant women. In the
context of forced medical treatment, courts assert that the state's in-
terest in the fetus, viable or not, permits the state to affirmatively re-
quire a pregnant woman to accept treatment to preserve fetal health
and life. This use of Roe's holding is the result of a grave misunder-
standing of the nature of the state's interest in the fetus outside of
the context of abortion. In fact, Roe's holding plainly does not ad-
dress the state's interest in the fetus outside of the context of abor-
tion.
A. Restrictions on Pregnant Women's Health Care Decision Making
Based on State Interests Articulated in Roe
Several courts have used the "compelling state interest" language
of Roe to support the restriction of women's medical decisions outside
of the abortion context. These courts mistakenly have concluded
that if the state's interest in a viable fetus is significant enough to
prohibit abortion, then it is also significant enough to compel un-
16wanted medical treatment for the fetus's sake. Arguably, the Su-preme Court's later decisions, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services7
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12 Id. at 153.
is Id. at 162.
14 Id. at 163-65.
15 Id. at 164.
16 See discussion of cases infra Part I.C and accompanying notes.
17 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,'8 elevated the state's interest in the
fetus. For example, in Webster, the Court questioned whether viability
should be the point where the state's interest in the fetus becomes
compelling, stating "we do not see why the State's interest in protect-
ing potential human life should come into existence only at the point
of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing
state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability."
Later, in Casey, the Court located the state's interest "from the outset
of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and life of
the fetus that may become a child."2 0 Nevertheless, the Court in Casey
upheld Roe's essential holding: a woman's right to abort a nonviable
fetus is a constitutionally protected interest.
2 1
By relying on the aforementioned passages from Webster and Casey,
which seem to expand the state's interest in the fetus, some courts
have interpreted Roe and its progeny to give the state an interest in a
fetus, viable or not, that permits the state to act in almost any way that
would prevent the destruction of the fetus or promote fetal healthY.
In these situations, the state attempts to limit the decisional and
physical privacy of pregnant women when it is believed that fetal
death or impaired health will be an unintended consequence of a
woman's medical decision making. Consequently, the state asserts an
interest in the fetus outside of the context of Roe's decisional orbit-
abortion. The expansion of the state's interest outside of the abor-
tion context miscomprehends and diminishes the interest of the
woman in her fetus and in her own health.
Although the Court in Roe did not provide women with an abso-
lute right to abortion, Roe and its progeny make clear that in the con-
text of abortion, women have the constitutional right to put their
own lives and health before that of their fetuses, even after viability.
Indeed, in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists,2 the Court affirmed the right of a pregnant woman to put her
own medical needs before those of her fetus. In Thornburgh, the
Court invalidated portions of a Pennsylvania abortion statute that ob-
ligated doctors, in circumstances where the life or health of the
pregnant woman was already at risk, to use abortion procedures that
18 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
19 Webster, 492 U.S. at 519.
20 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
21 Id.
See infra Part IC; see also RACHEL ROTH, MAKING WOMEN PAY: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF
FETAL RIGHTS 93-97 (2000) (noting that in many states judicial intervention in regards to
women's health care decisions is often sought and granted).
23 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1986)
(holding that states may not intimidate women into continuing pregnancies under the guise of
any asserted state interest in protecting maternal health or potential life).
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"'would provide the best opportunity for the unborn child to be
aborted alive unless,' ... that technique 'would present a significantly
greater medical risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman.
The Supreme Court upheld a determination that this requirement
and any other that endorsed or required an increase in maternal risk
was unconstitutional.' Therefore, the current law is unambiguous:
the state cannot prohibit a woman from obtaining an abortion, at any
time, including after fetal viability, if continuing her pregnancy would
be detrimental to her health or life.2 6 Hence, it must be unlawful for
the state to require any increased risk to maternal health for the sake
of fetal health outside of the abortion context as well.
B. State Intervention on Behalf of the Viable Fetus Is Not Supported
by Roe Outside of the Abortion Context
In addition to protecting women's health care decision making,
Roe and its progeny speak only to the interests of the state in the
24 Id. at 768 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1101(2), 1103(3) (1982)).
25 Id. The circuit court also ruled that the statue at issue was unconstitutional because it
"failed to require that maternal health be the physician's paramount consideration." Id. at 768-
69. Although the Supreme Court did not directly address this portion of the appellate opinion,
the Court nevertheless seemed to affirm it by stating that it is agreed with the circuit court's
analysis. Id. at 769; see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 389-90 (1979) (finding that a
woman's interest in abortion must prevail when it conflicts with those of the fetus).
Furthermore, portions of Thornburgh were later overruled by the Court's pronouncement in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Casey overruled Thornburgh on the issue of in-
formed consent by permitting the state to require physicians to give a patient information de-
signed to "persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion," on the grounds that the state has
an interest in the fetus from the outset of the pregnancy, though not compelling until viability.
Id. at 878. This permits the state to intervene in the abortion decision making so long as that
intervention does not unduly burden the woman's right to make the "ultimate decision" to
abort her fetus. Id. at 877. In so doing, the Casey Court seriously limited women's decision-
making autonomy, but not women's decision-making authority. Even though the state can now
behave in ways that are designed to convince women to pursue non-abortion alternatives, the
state undoubtedly cannot prohibit a woman pregnant with a nonviable fetus from obtaining an
abortion.
26 See id. at 846 (discussing how the state can only restrict abortions after fetal viability if the
law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life); id. at 879
("'[S]ubsequent to viability, the State ... may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abor-
tion except where it is necessary ... for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.'"
(quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65)). In Casey, the Court located the state's interest in the fetus
"from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fe-
tus that may become a child." Id. Earlier, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the Court
questioned the legitimacy of defining viability as the point where the state's interest in the fetus
becomes compelling: "[W]e do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential human
life should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore be
a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability." 492 U.S.
490, 519 (1989).
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context of abortion, the intentional destruction of the fetus. 27 These
cases simply do not address the state's interest in the fetus or in
women's health care outside of the abortion context, a unique situa-
tion. 8 In this sense, Roe implicitly leaves intact women's rights to dic-
tate their health care within the bounds of the common law and con-
stitutional liberty rights to make health care decisions. And although
the right to medical decision making is based, in part, on the com-
mon law right to bodily integrity29 and can be outweighed by four
countervailing state interests: 0  the preservation of life,' the
27 See, e.g., Cherry, The Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant Women, supra note 9, at 596 (discussing
state interests in the abortion context as defined by Roe, Casey, and Thornburgh).
28 Cf Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesare-
ans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1953 (1986) ("Roe merely allows states to prohibit intentional fetal
destruction after viability, unless abortion is needed to protect the woman's life or health. It
says nothing about whether the state may require invasive medical procedures to promote fetal
health." (footnote omitted)).
29 SeeAnita L. Allen-Castellitto, Origins and Growth of U.S. Privacy Law, in 701 PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 83, 88-90 (June 2002) (discussing conceptual and normative underpinnings of privacy
interests protected through state common law).
30 See, e.g., In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (explaining that the
courts generally consider four specific state interests "when deciding whether to override com-
petent treatment decisions"); In re President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., 331 F.2d 1000, 1006-
07 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (ordering treatment to override a patient's
incompetent treatment decision).
31 Regarding the state's interest in the preservation of life, the court in In re Fetus Brown as-
serted that this refers to the state's interest in the life of the decision maker. Hence, in the case
of a pregnant woman, the state's interest in the preservation of life is in the preservation of the
mother's life, not the life of the fetus. In addition, the state's interest in the preservation of life
must be balanced with the state's interest in protecting the patient's autonomy. In re Fetus
Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 404 (finding greater weight in the "interest in protecting the autonomy of
the individual," than the state's interest in preserving the pregnant woman's life).
In addition, both the American Medical Association and the American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists have taken the position that physicians should not, except under ex-
traordinary circumstances, seek judicial intervention to compel a pregnant woman to submit to
nonconsensual treatment. See Board of Trustees Report, American Medical Association, Legal
Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially
Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264JAMA 2663, 2666, 2670 (1990) [hereinafter AMA, Legal
Interventions During Pregnancy] (stating that judicial intervention is appropriate only in "excep-
tional circumstances," which are unlikely to occur); American College of Obstetrics and Gyne-
cology, Patient Choice and the Maternal-Fetal Relationship, in ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS AND
GYNECOLOGY 214 (1999), available at http://www.acog.org/from home/publications/ethics/
ethics6l.cfm. [hereinafter ACOG, Patient Choice] (arguing that physicians should refrain from
nonconsensual treatment; use of court orders to resolve conflicts between physicians and pa-
tients are almost never appropriate). Arguably then, judicially compelled treatment of preg-
nant women actually violates the integrity of the medical profession. Joelyn Knopf Levy makes a
similar point in Jehovah's Witnesses, Pregnancy, and Blood Transfusions: A Paradigm for the Autonomy
Rights of All Pregnant Women, 27J.L. MED. & ETHICS 171, 182 (1999), noting that a physician is
under no legal duty to seek a court order and that professional organizations do not recom-
mend using such orders.
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prevention of suicide, 2 the ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion, and the protection of innocent third parties," none of these
factors are implicated in cases regarding the compelled medical
treatment of pregnant women.35
Moreover, the right to medical decision making is part and parcel
of the right to privacy and self-determination found within the pe-
numbra of the Fourteenth Amendment.36  The Supreme Court, in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, noted that the values
of the Fourteenth Amendment the protection of bodily integrity and
its component, medical decision making. 7 The Court asserted that
32 Some commentators have noted that "[n]o reported case has held that a competent pa-
tient must undergo medical treatment he has refused in order to vindicate the state's interest in
the prevention of suicide." Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women:
"Compelling Each To Live as Seems Good to the Rest, "37 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 760 n.276 (1986).
Courts have generally held that the integrity of the medical profession is not disrupted by
or dispositive of the protection of patients' autonomy embodied in the right to refuse treat-
ment. See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 403 (allowing a pregnant mother to refuse life-saving
treatment in a hospital). But see Crouse Irving Mem'l Hosp. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443, 446
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (finding that a pregnant Jehovah's Witness who agreed to a cesarean sec-
tion operation but refused a blood transfusion on religious grounds could not prevent attend-
ing physicians from administering blood transfusions to stabilize her condition because the
ethical integrity of the medical profession and the physician required stabilization of a patient
following surgery).
34 Many of the most well-reasoned cases on this state interest involve compulsory vaccination
statutes, which override the freedom to refuse medical treatment because of the state's interest
in public health. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905) (finding that the
vaccination statute was permissible to protect the community from disease). Hence this interest
should be understood as the state's interest in the prevention of epidemics and other major
public health concerns. The state's interest in the compelled medical treatment of competent
pregnant women is not sufficiently public and therefore the state's interest in this context is not
heightened. In addition, until recently courts routinely overrode the autonomy of female pa-
tients in order to protect their minor children from abandonment. See, e.g., In re President &
Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., 331 F.2d at 1006-07 (compelling life-saving treatment for the mother
of a seven-month-old child); In re Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 490 N.Y.S. 2d 996, 997 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1985) (compelling transfusions during surgery against religious objections of a mother of
young children "to save the life of the mother of infants"). More recently, courts have refused
to subordinate patient autonomy to the state's interest in protecting minor children. See, e.g., In
re Matter of Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993) (refusing to compel treatment where there was
no proof that a patient's children would be orphaned if she died); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551
N.E.2d 77, 84 (N.Y. 1990) (refusing to compel life-saving treatment "because there is a risk that
their children will be left orphans" where a competent adult makes a health care decision).
35 Pub. Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 1989) ("[T]hese factors are by no
means a bright-line test, capable of resolving every dispute regarding the refusal of medical
treatment.").
3 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-271 (1990); see also In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. NewJersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)
(granting a patient in a vegetative state the right to die as an exercise of the "unwritten constitu-
tional right of privacy.. . in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights").
37 Several commentators have asserted that the individual's right to refuse medical treat-
ment is also supported by the Fourth Amendment right granting freedom from unreasonable
search and seizures, because the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted as implicitly
embodying a right to privacy. See, e.g., Rebekah R. Arch, The Maternal-Fetal Rights Dilemma: Hon-
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"[t] he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred from [the Court's] prior decisions,""and that the "Due
Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in re-
fusing life-sustaining medical treatment."39
Therefore it seems clear, that even in situations involving fetal vi-
ability, pregnant women retain a constitutionally protected interest in
their own lives. 0 By protecting women's decisional and physical
autonomy in health care decision making outside of the context of
abortion, like in Cruzan, the Court's opinions seem to support
women's right to autonomy over the state's interest in the life and
health of the fetus, except in the narrow case of the abortion of a vi-
able fetus when the pregnant woman's life and health are not com-
promised by continuing the pregnancy.4 As a consequence, the state
should have no power to constrain pregnant women's medical deci-
sion-making powers, even when fetal health or life is compromised as
an unintended consequence of women's non-abortion health care
decisions, Roe and its progeny leave intact women's rights to make
their own health care decisions.
oring a Woman's Choice of Medical Care During Pregnancy, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 637,
644-45 (1996) (noting that the Fourth Amendment's implicit grant of privacy has been held to
include a "fundamental right to bodily integrity" and the "right to reproductive autonomy");
Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 21 (1987) (stating that a determination of reasonableness of a search requires
balancing the individual privacy interest against the state's need for evidence).
38 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278; cf. Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 721-22 (1997) (rec-
ognizing the right to bodily integrity as a liberty interest protected by the Bill of Rights); Wash-
ington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (finding that prisoners have a liberty interest to
be free from the arbitrary administration of medication without consent and nonconsensual
treatment may be administered only if prisoner is danger to himself or others).
39 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281; see also id at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing further that
this Constitutional protection is related to "our notions of liberty ... our idea of physical free-
dom and self-determination" and the idea that "state incursions into the body [are] repug-
nant").
40 Id. at 281 (acknowledging that the "choice between life and death is a deeply personal
decision"). In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor argues that the Constitution supports the
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment "[blecause our notions of liberty are inextricably
entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often
deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process
Clause." Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41 SeePlanned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (reaffirming that the state may
only restrict abortion of a viable fetus). In Cruzan, Justice O'Connor argues that the Constitu-
tion supports the liberty interest of refusing medical treatment "[b
] 
ecause our notions of liberty
are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court
has often deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the
Due Process Clause." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring). When read together,
these opinions support the proposition that the state cannot deny women autonomy in health
care decision making with regards to pregnancy, except in the narrow case of the abortion of a
viable fetus, and then only if the pregnant woman's life and health are not endangered by con-
tinuing the pregnancy.
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Despite its attractiveness to some courts, the argument that the
state has a compelling interest in a viable fetus outside of the context
of abortion miscomprehends the state's responsibilities toward the
fetus and the pregnant woman. While the state's interest in the vi-
able fetus may be compelling in the abortion context, it is not abso-
lute. In fact, the state's interest is not so broad as to reduce a
woman's interest in her own health to the health of her fetus.4 2 Nor is
the state's interest strong enough to reduce women's decision mak-
ing outside of the context of abortion. The state's compelling inter-
est in the viable fetus allows it to prevent abortion under limited cir-
cumstances, but nowhere does Roe or its progeny suggest that the
state's interest in the fetus empowers the state to "choose between
treatment options for the pregnant woman when abortion is not an
issue,"* and by so doing, disregard the woman's decisional authority
and hence, her autonomy.
In sum, Roe and its progeny use the rubrics of privacy and liberty
rights to leave intact a pregnant woman's right to make health care
decisions without state interference outside of the context of abor-
tion simply because these decisions are limited to abortion choices.
This is certainly the case in the context of a nonviable fetus, but I be-
lieve that this is also true in the context of fetal viability. The Court
simply has not addressed the issue of whether the state's interest in
the fetus is compelling when harm to the fetus is an unintended con-
sequence of a woman's medical decision making, which is normally
protected by constitutional principles of physical and decisional pri-
vacy. Nor has the Supreme Court implied that its abortion decisions
are precedents in other medical contexts. Thus, abortion decisions
must be viewed with caution when imported to other medical con-
texts.
C. State Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women
The majority of reported cases of judicially compelled treatment
of pregnant women, decided after Roe, have relied on Roe's articula-
tion of the state's interest in the fetus. The unwanted medical treat-
ment is forced on competent pregnant women for the sake of their
fetuses, at times without regard to fetal viability. These cases present
serious encroachments on the autonomy, and hence, the citizenship
42 See Arch, supra note 37, at 650 (stating that the compelling interest in the life of fetus is
limited by woman's right to privacy); Gallagher, supra note 37, at 28-29 (same); Nelson, et al.,
supra note 32, at 742 (same).
43 Arch, supra note 37, at 650; see also Nelson et al., supra note 32, at 745 (arguing that inci-
dent to woman's right to privacy, women's health care interests and choices are superior to
state's interest in the potential life of fetus).
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of women." One such example is Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County
Hospital Authority.45 In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia sum-
marily cited to Roe in explaining its right to order a pregnant woman,
Mrs. Jefferson, to submit to a nonconsensual cesarean section to de-
liver her viable fetus. 46 The trial court had ordered the surgery based
on its finding that "as a matter of law ... this child is a viable human
being and entitled to the protection of the Juvenile Court Code of
Georgia., 47 Furthermore, the trial court had found that any "intru-
sion ... into the life" of Mrs. Jefferson or her husband was "out-
weighed by the duty of the State to protect a living, unborn human
being from meeting his or her death before being given the oppor-
tunity to live."" Reviewing the trial court decision, the Georgia Su-
preme Court merely cited the United States Supreme Court decision
in Roe and a pre-Roe New Jersey Supreme Court decision, Raleigh Fit-
kin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson,45 to support the denial
of Mrs. Jefferson's motion for a stay.50
State courts in New York have also cited the state's compelling in-
terest in a viable fetus articulated in Roe as the rationale for coercing
unwanted medical procedures on competent pregnant women. For
example, a New York trial court in In rejamaica Hospital ordered the
transfusion of a woman whose pregnancy was only in its eighteenth
week.51 This decision is remarkable because the fetus at eighteen
44 But see In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (ruling that when a
woman, pregnant with a viable fetus, is near death, the question of what is to be done should be
decided by the woman); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 326 (Il1. App. Ct. 1994) (holding
that a competent woman's choice to refuse advice to obtain a cesarean section during preg-
nancy must be honored even when her choice may be harmful to the fetus). There are a few
reported cases of court-ordered medical treatment of pregnant women prior to Roe. For exam-
ple, in 1964, the NewJersey Supreme Court issued the first reported decision of a court compel-
ling an unwanted, nonconsensual medical procedure on a pregnant woman for the sake of her
fetus. In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court compelled an unwanted blood transfusion
on a pregnant Jehovah's Witness against her religious based opposition for the sake of her vi-
able fetus. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem'l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (NJ. 1964) (per
curiam). Even though the trial court would not order the procedure against the woman's
wishes, the New Jersey Supreme Court did, stating simply that it was "satisfied that the unborn
child is entitled to the law's protection." Id. at 538. See also In re President & Dirs. of George-
town Coll., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (authorizing a blood transfusion on a nonpregnant
woman who refused the transfusion based on her religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
45 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) (per curiam).
46 Id. at 458.
47 Id. at 459.
48 Id. at 460.
49 201 A.2d 537 (NJ. 1964) (per curiam) (compelling an unwanted blood transfusion on a
pregnant Jehovah's Witness against her opposition).
50 Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 460. Nevertheless, as previously noted, Mrs. Jefferson gave birth to
a healthy child in a vaginal delivery without the assistance of medical personnel. Rhoden, supra
note 28, at 1959-60.
51 In rejam. Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899-900 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
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weeks obviously was not yet viable. Nevertheless, the court com-
pelled the transfusion, which went far beyond the holding of Roe in
its rationale, but nonetheless the court relied on Roe for support.
The court completely disregarded the issue of whether it had a con-
stitutionallyjustified interest in a nonviable fetus by stating:
While I recognize that the fetus in this case is not yet viable, and that
the state's interest in protecting its life would be less than "compelling"
in the context of the abortion cases, this is not such a case. In this case,
the state has a highly significant interest in protecting the life of a mid-
term fetus, which outweighs the patient's right to refuse a blood transfu-
sion on religious grounds.53
In addition, the District of Columbia's Superior Court has com-
pelled at least one cesarean section surgery despite the pregnant
woman's refusal to consent. In In re Madyun, the court relied on Roe,
Raleigh Fitkin, and Jamaica Hospital to hold that the compelling inter-
est of the state in a fetus justifies overriding the refusal of a pregnant
woman to consent to treatment, even when that refusal is based partly
on a religious objection.54 Finally, and indeed quite recently, in
Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc., a federal
district court upheld a state court order compelling a cesarean sec-
tion for the sake of the fetus.55  After losing her bid to be allowed to
refuse the cesarean section in state court,5 Mrs. Pemberton sued the
hospital in federal court alleging that several of her constitutional
rights were violated, including her First Amendment right to free ex-
ercise and her rights to privacy and bodily integrity.57 Like the state
courts in the aforementioned cases, the Pemberton court gave little
weight to Mrs. Pemberton's claims. Instead, the court focused on the
"right" of the fetus to life and the compelling state interest in the vi-
52 Id. at 900. Although the woman's refusal was based on her religious beliefs, the court
nevertheless ordered the blood transfusion, noting that although the woman had "an important
and protected interest in the exercise of her religious beliefs," these interests could be disre-
garded because of her pregnancy. Id. at 899.
In reJam. Hospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900. But see Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983) (refus-
ing to compel nonconsensual treatment of competent pregnant woman where fetus was not yet
viable).
In re Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. Law Rptr. 2233, 2240 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986). This case has
been called into serious question by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals's en banc opin-
ion in In re AC., where the court held that "it was error for the trial court to weigh the state's
interest in preserving the potential life of a viable fetus against" the pregnant woman's right to
refuse medical treatment. 573 A.2d 1235, 1238 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999). The physicians at the Medical Center predicted
that the odds of Mrs. Pemberton having a successful vaginal birth were slight given that she had
previously had a cesarean section in which a vertical incision was used. The previous incision
dramatically increased the risk of uterine rupture and the death of Mrs. Pemberton and her
fetus. Id. at 1249.
5 Id. at 1250.
57 Id. at 1251.
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able fetus, rather than the pregnant woman's right to make decisions
regarding her health care. The court stated:
Recognizing these constitutional interests, however, is only the be-
ginning, not the end, of the analysis. Ms. Pemberton was at full term and
actively in labor. It was clear that one way or the other, a baby would be
born (or stillborn) very soon, certainly within hours. Whatever the scope
of Ms. Pemberton's personal constitutional rights in this situation, they
clearly did not outweigh the interests of the State of Florida in preserving
the life of the unborn child."
As in cases that preceded it in other jurisdictions, the court in
Pemberton asserted that its decision limiting women's constitutional
rights was supported by the United States Supreme Court decision in
Roe. The pregnant women's interests were simply subordinate to the
state's interests in fetal life:
The balance tips far more strongly in favor of the state in the case at
bar, because here the full-term baby's birth was imminent, and more im-
portantly, here the mother sought only to avoid a particular procedure
for giving birth, not to avoid giving birth altogether. Bearing an un-
wanted child is surely a greater intrusion on the mother's constitutional
interests than undergoing a caesarean section to deliver a child that the
mother affirmatively desires to deliver. Thus the state's interest here was
greater, and the mother's interest less, than during the third trimester
situation addressed in Roe. Here, as there, the state's interest outweighed
59the mother's.
The court also noted the argument that the state's intervention in a
woman's pregnancy is more intrusive than the state's prohibition of a
third trimester abortion, but disregarded it stating:
One could argue that affirmative intervention is more intrusive on the
mother's constitutional interests than the mere prohibition discussed in
Roe. But any such distinction between affirmative conduct and mere
prohibitions is superficial.... [A] third-trimester mother can be forced
against her will to bear a child she does not want; this is in fact a substan-
tially greater imposition on the mother's constitutional interests than re-
quiring a mother to give birth by one method rather than another. And
this is so notwithstanding that caesarean section is major surgery that is
extraordinarily intrusive on the mother's constitutional interests.
The Pemberton court, like the courts in the majority of reported
cases, reasoned that because the state has a compelling interest in a
viable fetus, which permits it to prohibit the abortion of a viable fetus,
the state must have a similar interest in the fetus in other contexts.
These courts assume that the privacy and liberty interests of women
are diminished by pregnancy, and that women's interests in privacy
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1251-52 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1252 & n.9.
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and bodily integrity must always give way to the state's interest in the
fetus. These assumptions are not supported by Supreme Court juris-
prudence. Indeed two state appellate courts have held that these ju-
dicially enforced bodily intrusions are impermissible as they violate a
pregnant woman's rights to privacy and bodily integrity. In one such
case, In re A. C., the District of Columbia Court of Appeals sitting en
banc, held that a trial court order compelling a nonconsensual cesar-
ean section on a comatose pregnant woman intended to save the life
of an arguably viable fetus was unlawful, as it violated both her right
to privacy and bodily integrity.6 ' Regarding the right to privacy, the
en banc court stated that "weigh [ing] the state's interest in preserv-
ing the potential life of a viable fetus against [the pregnant woman's]
interest in having her decision respected" was impermissible.62
The foregoing analysis exposes that the rationales used for over-
riding the right of competent women to refuse medical treatment are
misplaced due to courts' mistaken reliance on the Supreme Court's
opinion in Roe. The compelled medical treatment examples show
that these courts' reasoning that almost any interest that the state
may have in the fetus is sufficient to outweigh the woman's rights to
decisional and physical autonomy is not consonant with Roe.
Although Roe and its progeny may narrow the pregnant woman's
right to direct her medical treatment, as I have previously argued,
they do so in a very limited fashion. The state may only prohibit the
abortion or the intentional destruction of a viable fetus if the
woman's life or health is not at risk. Consequently, considering the
opinions in Roe and its progeny, pregnant women retain the right to
direct their medical care, including the right to refuse medical treat-
ment that might protect or enhance fetal life or health. The courts
in these aforementioned examples violate the common law and con-
stitutional rights of individual women to refuse medical treatment.
The Jamaica Hospital and Pemberton courts seemed to recognize the
limitations on their actions vis-A-vis Roe, but proceeded nonetheless,
showing substantial disregard for the fundamental constitutional
rights of the women affected.
II. HARMS TO INDMDUAL WOMEN
The en banc opinion in In re A. C. highlights that the harms done
to women by court-ordered treatment are extensive. Not only are
women's privacy and bodily integrity rights harmed by nonconsensual
treatment on behalf of the fetus, but women's dignitary interests are
61 In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
62 Id. at 1238.
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harmed by the objectification that occurs as a result of nonconsen-
sual treatment.
63
Nonconsensual treatment violates the individual woman's right to
privacy, her liberty interest in medical decision making and bodily in-
tegrity. These harms stem from a series of misguided beliefs with re-
gard to pregnancy and pregnant women: (1) that the state's interest
in the fetus, viable or not, is stronger than the state's interest in the
health and life of the woman; (2) that the woman's interest in her
own bodily integrity and medical decision making is irrelevant given
that she risks death with her decision to withhold or withdraw medi-
cal treatment;64 and lastly, (3) that the woman's interest in privacy
and bodily integrity is inconsequential or nonexistent.
65
A pregnant woman's right to privacy is most clearly violated by a
judicial order that disregards her competent decision to refuse or
withdraw medical treatment when the fetus she carries is not viable.66
Even if the state has a compelling interest in a viable fetus outside of
the context of abortion, the state's interest in a nonviable fetus does
not permit the state to prohibit its abortion. Such state interference
would clearly be understood as unduly burdensome of women's pri-
vacy rights as articulated in Casey. As Justice O'Connor wrote for the
Court in Casey "It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that
Roe's essential holding, the holding we reaffirm [includes] ... a rec-
ognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion be-
fore viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the
State. 67  Consequently, it also would be unreasonably burdensome
for the state to prohibit the destruction of a nonviable fetus when it is
an unintended consequence of a health care decision made in favor
of the woman.
Furthermore, the pregnant woman's right to bodily integrity is
violated by judicially compelled medical treatment. The Supreme
63 Cf Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (recognizing the connection between
dignity, subordination, and inequality while noting that racial segregation of children in public
schools "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone").
64 Although perhaps more obviously relevant in the living will context, this belief is also rele-
vant in the context ofjudicially compelled medical treatment. For example, women who refuse
blood transfusions sometimes make this decision despite deadly consequences.
65 See, e.g., Phillip E. Johnson, The ACLU Philosophy and the Right To Abuse the Unborn, in
EXPECTING TROUBLE: SURROGACY, FETAL ABUSE, & NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 135-41
(Patricia Boling ed., 1995) (critizing the American Civil Liberty Union's moral conclusion that
pregnant women have a right to use drugs or engage in other conduct that harms an unborn
child).
66 See Katharine A. Taylor, Compelling Pegnancy at Death's Door, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 85,
112-13 (1997) (arguing that if a woman may abort a fetus before viability, she should be able to
.refuse life-sustaining medical treatment mandated solely for the purpose of saving the life of
the pre-viable fetus" (emphasis omitted)).
67 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
Apr. 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Court's opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
supports the argument that court-ordered and legislatively imposed
medical treatment violate the bodily integrity of pregnant women.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that
the right to refuse medical treatment was a liberty interest protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Rehnquist declared
that "[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may
be inferred from [the Court's] prior decisions."6 Moreover, the
Court in Cruzan also stated that "the Due Process Clause protects an
interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining med-
ical treatment.,
69
In addition, the Court's holding in Thornburgh, prohibiting the
state from weighing a pregnant woman's health or life against the
health or life of her viable fetus in circumstances of abortion, can
only be read as also prohibiting the state from weighing the pregnant
woman's life or health against that of her fetus when the fetus is not
viable.0 Any state action of this sort would clearly violate the preg-
nant woman's right to privacy.
An Illinois appellate court understood the limits of the state's in-
terest in the fetus outside of the abortion context when, in In re Baby
Bay Doe, it refused to compel a blood transfusion and cesarean section
on a pregnant woman for the sake of her viable fetus. The Illinois
appellate court held that it is unconstitutional to weigh the predic-
tion of fetal harm "against the right of the competent woman to
choose the type of medical care she deem [s] appropriate .... ,7' The
court further held that "[t] he potential impact upon the fetus is not
legally relevant; to the contrary, the ... court explicitly rejected the
view that the woman's rights can be subordinated to fetal rights."
72
Consequently, courts that have held otherwise have subordinated
women's rights to privacy and bodily integrity to the state's interest in
the life or health of the fetus. These courts have violated fundamen-
tal constitutional rights of pregnant women.
68 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); see also Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (describing the Court's established method of substantive
due process analysis); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (describing the fac-
tual circumstances that must exist before the state may administer antipsychotic drugs to a pris-
oner against his will).
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. Justice O'Connor's concurrence argues that this protection stems
from "our notion of liberty [which] are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom
and self-determination."
70 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 769 (1986).
71 In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Il. App. Ct. 1994).
72 Id. at 332 (citing Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1998)); see also In reA.C., 573
A.2d 1235, 1242, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("Surely... a fetus cannot have rights in this
respect superior to those of a person who has already been born.").
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The courts' decisions in both In re A. C. and In re Baby Boy Doe dem-
onstrate their understanding that women have a liberty interest in
medical decision making and they do not lose that interest upon
becoming pregnant. Indeed, if women lose their interest in bodily
integrity at conception, then we would allow the state to objectify
women-to treat them solely as a thing to be used for the good of
another or the good of the nation. As Justice Brennan asserted in his
dissent in Cruzan, the liberty interest that permitted Nancy Cruzan to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment could not lie solely in her in-
terest in avoiding pain, unless something greater was at stake. If it
did, as Justice Brennan stated:
[I]t is not apparent why a State could not choose to remove one of her
kidneys without consent on the ground that society would be better off if
the recipient of that kidney were saved from renal poisoning.... In-
deed, why could the State not perform medical experiments on her body,
experiments that might save countless lives, and would cause her no
greater burden than she already bears ....
Accordingly, at the very least, the rights to privacy and bodily integrity
protect the right not to have one's body or one's self objectified or
used for the good of others. When pregnant women are treated
against their will for the sake of their fetuses; their "own health inter-
ests [are rendered] totally irrelevant by forcing [them] to undergo
potentially painful and invasive medical treatment that is of no bene-
fit to [them] .,7 The woman's experience is rendered legally irrele-
vant. At every point, the physical pain and suffering experienced by
the pregnant woman as the result of the nonconsensual procedures is
disregarded by the courts. She, and every other woman, is told that
the pain and suffering of women is of no account to the state, espe-
cially when compared to the potential life or health of a fetus. 75 In-
deed, there are few, if any, instances of greater objectification than
that which occur when the person upon whom medical aid is being
performed is rendered immaterial.
7 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 313 n.13 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
74 Taylor, supra note 66, at 110.
75 See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced Medical
Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. REV. 487 (1992) (illustrating that when reproductive
choice is considered a gender issue, without addressing issues of race and class, a complete un-
derstanding of patriarchy is prevented).
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III. THE HARM TO WOMEN AS A SOCIAL CLASS: WOMEN'S
CONSIGNMENT TO SECOND-CLASS CITIZENSHIP
Not only are the individual pregnant women who are compelled
to have medical treatment without their consent harmed, women as a
social class are also harmed by the coerced medical treatment of
pregnant women. These harms take two interrelated forms. Women
as a class are harmed by their resulting subordination to their repro-
ductive capacities and state-sanctioned gender roles. Relatedly,
women as a class are harmed by the way in which this subordination
excludes them from full citizenship status. In this Section I expand
on these arguments and further argue that by seperating the value of
autonomy from the rigid constructs of liberalism, we can then protect
it in such a way as to guarantee to women a fuller citizenship.
A. The Subordination of Women to Their Reproductive Capacities and
State-Sanctioned Mothering Roles
The compelled medical treatment of pregnant women demon-
strates one way in which women's autonomy is dependent upon
women conforming to state-sanctioned stereotypes regarding who
women are and what their appropriate roles are in society. In other
words, compelled medical treatment in this context underscores that
an essential component of women's citizenship, physical and deci-
sional autonomy, will be neither promoted or protected unless
women conform to state-sanctioned mothering roles. Arguably, one
of the most important of these sanctioned roles is altruism. Only
when pregnant women make altruistic choices on behalf of their fe-
tuses, are their choices assured of state protection. When pregnant
women wish to make themselves, their lives, their desires, or their
values primary, courts have instead restricted women's autonomy by
compelling unwanted, nonconsensual treatment on behalf of the fe-
tus.
We live in a culture where altruism is the social norm for women.
Indeed altruism is often viewed as women's defining moral character-
istic."' For example, according to psychologist Carol Gilligan, the
76 See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 24-63, 159-60 (1982) (discussing how women perceive themselves in relation to
others within society and how they define themselves in relation to accomplishments in rela-
tionships more than academic or career accomplishments); see also NANCY CHODOROW, THE
REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 178 (1978)
(describing "[w]omen's roles [as] basically familial, and concerned with personal, affective
ties"); PATRICE DIQUINZIO, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MOTHERHOOD: FEMINISM, INDIVIDUALISM, AND
THE PROBLEM OF MOTHERING xiii (1999) (examining the conflicted relationship of feminism
and individualism); PETCHESKY, supra note 2, at 328 (explaining the modem definition of
motherhood as a "total and selfless devotion to one's biological children").
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socialization of women and girls focuses on their relationships with
others, exercising care and concern for others, and nurturing oth-
ers." This social norm takes on added significance in discourses con-
cerning motherhood, where women are altruistic, and motherhood is
their essential purpose."' As mothers, women are expected to be
completely self-sacrificing and selfless. They are expected to be will-
ing to sacrifice their own lives for their children or their fetuses. 9 As
Janice Raymond argues, "on a cultural level women are expected to
donate themselves in the form of time, energy, and body, particularly
as mothers."s Women who do not behave in these stereotypical ways
are deemed deviant, "placing [themselves] outside female nature and
culture.",8  More importantly, these women risk placing themselves
outside of the law's protection, for the force of law continues to be
used to ensure women's compliance with female social norms.82
These social norms, pertaining to women and their proper role,
have been enforced throughout our nation's history by the power of
law. For example, the denial of women's admission to the bar8 and
protective labor legislation for women" were predicated on gendered
social roles and enforced by law. The law enforced these state-
sanctioned roles even in the face of one of the primary obligations of
citizenship: jury service. Women were initially excluded from jury
service 5 and then excused from such service s6 on account of these so-
cial norms regarding the altruistic mother.
77 GILLIGAN, supra note 76; see also Nel Noddings, Ethics from the Standpoint of Women, in
THEORETICAL PERSPECrIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 160 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990) (defend-
ing the construction of female ethics based on women's traditional role as nurturer).
78 See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 238 (1979) (citing psy-
chologist Bruno Bettelheim, who asserted that women "'want first and foremost.., to be moth-
ers'").
See PETCHESKY, supra note 2.
80 JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS 52 (1993); see also id. at 47 (discussing postmortem
obstetrical interventions).
81 Janice G. Raymond, Reproductive Gifts and Gift Giving: The Altruistic Woman, in LIFE
CHOICES: A HASTINGS CENTER INTRODUCTION TO BIOETHICS 395, 399 (Joseph H. Howell & Wil-
liam F. Sale eds., 2d ed. 2000); see also DIQUINZIO, supra note 76, at xiii (arguing that femininity
is defined by the attributes of maternity).
82 See Cherry, Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, supra note 9, at 257 (explaining that once women are
described as deviant from social norms, they become subject to physician and judicial control).
83 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (1 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (holding that the Illinois law,
which denied the admission of women to the bar, did not abridge any of the privileges and im-
munities of the citizens of the United States).
84 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908) (upholding the constitutionality of the
Oregon statute, which limited the hours of employment for women).
See, e.g., State v. Hall, 187 So. 2d 861 (Miss. 1966) (upholding Mississippi statute excluding
women from jury service because of their maternal role).
86 See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding Florida statute granting women an
absolute exemption fromjury service; finding no Fourteenth Amendment violation of the rights
of potential women jurors or women defendants), overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
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In the context of pregnancy, women who make choices that en-
danger their fetuses are acting outside of the prescribed social norm.
As Rosalind Petchesky states: "The woman who has an abortion
makes a clear statement about her life and her understanding of her
moral and social commitments relative to a potential maternal rela-
tionship; she renounces, defies the concept of motherhood as a total
self-sacrifice for the sake of others. 8 7 Women who refuse medical
treatment that would benefit their fetuses make a very similar state-
ment. They tell us that their own values and their own lives are more
important than that of their fetuses. In doing so, they risk state inter-
vention in the medical decision making and risk losing the ability to
act as autonomous moral agents.
Consequently, judicially compelled medical treatment alters
women's relationship to the state. It minimizes women's standing as
citizens by constraining women's ability to act autonomously in the
same ways that men do.ss Women's autonomy is constrained when
they fail to conform to the social norm of the altruistic mother. Ac-
cordingly, when the state disregards women's pregnancy-related deci-
sion making, the state diminishes women's citizenship vis-a-vis men;
consigning women to something less than full citizenship, which is
forbidden by our current constitutional norms.89
B. The Tradition of Women's Exclusion from Full Citizenship
Citizenship, in its most restrictive meaning, is "simply" a legal
status.9° Either one is a citizen or not.91 In a democracy, the central
(1975) (holding that statutory provisions exempting women from jury service have the effect of
excluding them in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to ajury of peers).
87 PETCHESKY, supra note 2, at 340-41.
8s See CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN'S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLITICS OF FETAL
RIGHTS 2 (1993) ("Women's rights as citizens are potentially made contingent by fetal rights.
They can be revoked or qualified by the state's higher interest in the fetus."); see also Taylor,
supra note 66, at 163 ("[Pjregnancy restrictions similarly enforce a double standard for the citi-
zenship status of men and women. Men (rightly) retain their most fundamental interest as citi-
zens... while women's same liberty is made contingent on whether their bodies may be used to
medically sustain a fetus.").
89 The Court has recognized:
[T]hat neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection
principle when a law ... denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizen-
ship stature-equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to soci-
ety based on their individual talents and capacities.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
90 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 54 (1975) ("Citizenship is at best a
simple idea for a simple government."). But as Kenneth Karst has noted, "[t]he formal status of
citizenship can seem trifling only when you are able to take it for granted." Kenneth L. Karst,
Citizenship, Law, and the American Nation, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 595, 596 (2000). For
African-Americans living under Jim Crow, or for resident aliens today, legal status was of im-
mense importance. Id. at 596.
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values of citizenship are rights and obligations. With regard to rights,
Professor Kenneth Karst notes: "Once we recognize that citizenship is
more than the 'simple idea' of legal status, the value of participation
can be seen to embrace a fuller range of sharing the public life of the
society."92  Thus expanded, citizenship also includes both "[t]he
equality of political rights" and "[t] he dignity of work and of personal
achievement,"9 or in other words, citizenship includes political, so-
cial, and economic rights and opportunities-the ability to control
one's own life. The rights of privacy and bodily integrity protect this
value of citizenship. By disregarding women's pregnancy-related de-
cision making, the state diminishes women's citizenship by restricting
women's autonomy and equality. In so doing, the state subordinates
women to their reproductive role and the state-sanctioned definition
of appropriate womanhood, thus prohibiting women from speaking
in their own voices.
However, the liberal concept of citizenship has been highly criti-
cized, and properly so, because it has excluded women from its defi-
nition of full citizenshipN As philosopher Susan James asserts, the
liberal conception of citizenship accomplishes this
by denying women the full complement of rights and privileges accorded
to men, and more insidiously, by taking for granted a conception of citi-
zenship which excludes all that is traditionally female. The cluster of ac-
tivities, values, ways of thinking and ways of doing things which have long
been associated with women are all conceived as outside the political
world of citizenship and largely irrelevant to it."
Despite the "egalitarian aspirations" of liberalism and of American
democracy, American women, along with other women in the world,
continue to be deprived of full citizenship as "democratic liberal the-
ory still nurtures a conception of politics which implicitly marginal-
izes and disadvantages women., 96 Much of this disadvantage comes
91 See Kunal M. Parker, State, Citizenship, and Territory: The Legal Construction of Immigrants in
Antebellum Massachusetts, 19 L. & HIST. REv. 583, 583 (2001)" ("Modern citizenship-understood
in terms of the formal legal distinction between 'citizen' and 'alien' ... determines whether a
given individual does or does not enjoy unimpeded rights .... ").
92 Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreward: Equal Citizenship Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1977).
93 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 1 (1991).
94 See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 110-11 (1990)
(noting that marginalized groups, specifically women, gays and lesbians, and people of color
have been excluded from citizenship); see also id. at 54-55 (arguing that marginalized groups
should not be deprived of choice and respect in democratic society).
95 Susan James, The Good-Enough Citizen: Female Citizenship and Independence, in BEYOND
EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE: CITIZENSHIP, FEMINIST POLITICS, AND FEMALE SUBJECIVITY 48
(Gisela Bock & Susan James eds., 1992).
96 Id.; see also MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 157-70 (1989) (discussing the role of feminism in
the liberal state); Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinc-
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from the deeply held belief that noninterference by the state protects
and enhances the ability of citizens to act in an autonomous manner.
As a result, radical feminists believe that liberalism, because of its
misogynist and patriarchal foundations, is beyond repair and hence
has nothing to offer women but second-class citizenship.7 As Pate-
man argues:
The patriarchal understanding of citizenship means that the two de-
mands [(employment and motherhood) I are incompatible because it al-
lows two alternatives only: either women become (like) men, and so full
citizens; or they continue at women's work [(motherhood)], which is of
no value for citizenship.... To demand that citizenship, as it now exists,
should be fully extended to women accepts the patriarchal meeting of
[the term, and] ... at best, citizenship can be extended to women only as
lesser men. At the same time, within the patriarchal welfare state, to de-
mand proper social recognition and support for women's responsibilities
is to condemn women to less than full citizenship .... 98
Nevertheless, some feminists have suggested that liberalism may yet
have some potential for liberation of women if the society endorses a
more just, and perhaps radical, conception of citizenship that takes
into account the material conditions needed for women to fully par-
ticipate in the political, social, and economic life of the nation.9 Of
course, in order for this to occur, we must destroy the distinctions be-
tween the public and private that have operated to fuel women's in-
visibility, while keeping the opportunities for individual decision mak-
ing, and the opportunities for women to speak in their own voice.'
A fundamental task in the pursuit of equal citizenship is an under-
standing of the role of autonomy in citizenship and the ways that so-
ciety limits women's autonomy, thus denying them full citizenship.
tion, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 327 (1993) (explaining that public/private distinctions, which
are part and parcel of liberal theory, draw boundaries that perpetuate women's subordination).
97 See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, INTERSECTING VOICES: DILEMMAS OF GENDER, POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, AND POLICY 3 (1997) ("[T]he basic social conditions to which feminists called at-
tention twenty years ago for the most part have not improved, and in some areas... have dete-
riorated."); ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 102 (1983) ("Whether
or not they believe that women's subordination is primary in the historical sense, radical femi-
nists generally agree that it is primary in the causal sense of constituting the root of many other
social problems."); MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 170 ("Male power is systemic. Coercive, legiti-
mated, and epistemic, it is the regime.").
98 CAROLE PATEMEN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL
THEORY 197 (1989).
99 See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections on Citi-
zenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 419, 451-52 (1995) (illustrating
how liberal political theories can be used to support not only a woman's choice to have an abor-
tion but also access to an abortion); cf linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Femi-
nist Conception of Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 765 (1999) (arguing that privacy is not
simply a negative liberty but one that government must secure).
100 See PATEMAN, supra note 98, at 52-53.
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C. Autonomy's Liberatory Potential
Autonomy, understood as decisional privacy, is essential for citi-
zenship in the liberal state because it allows citizens to engage in the
political and economic life of the nation.10 1 As such, it is at the heart
of our privacy jurisprudence. At the same time however, privacy ju-
risprudence often has failed to protect women's ability to act in
autonomous ways. Hence, autonomy is simultaneously necessary and
problematic. Professor Catharine MacKinnon has eloquently de-
scribed privacy and the problem that privacy jurisprudence creates
for women. She writes:
Regarded as the outer edge of the limitations on government, the
idea of privacy embodies a tension between precluding public exposure
or governmental intrusion on the one hand, and autonomy in the sense
of protecting personal self-action on the other. This is a tension, not just
two facets of one right. The liberal state resolves this tension by identify-
ing the threshold of the state at its permissible extent of penetration into
a domain that is considered free by definition: the private sphere. By
this move the state secures "an inviolable personality" by ensuring
"autonomy of control over the intimacies of personal identity. The state
does this by centering its self-restraint on body and home, especially bed-
room. By staying out of marriage and the family-essentially mean-
ing... heterosexuality-from contraception through pornography to the
abortion decision, the law of privacy proposes to guarantee individual
bodily integrity, personal exercise of moral intelligence, and freedom of
intimacy.... The law of privacy ... translates traditional liberal values
101 See McClain, supra note 99, at 766 (noting that Professor Anita Allen's view of "private
choice" is consistent with the argument that liberalism is premised on ethical individualism and
moral independence and thus the government "'must not dictate what its citizens think about
matters of political... judgment'" (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL
READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 26 (1996)); see also YOUNG, supra note 94, at 123-24
(discussing how traditionally autonomy has been defined as "a sense of self-confidence, and
inner direction, as well as the ability to be reflective, not swayed by immediate impulse or blind
emotion in the making of political argument"). Tracy Higgins argues that the importance of
autonomy depends upon one's orientation. She asserts:
This assumption of agency-of citizens' freedom and ability to define their own ends-is
therefore essential to all mainstream constitutional theory. For rights foundationalists,
the self-determining individual stands at the core of liberal commitments to neutrality.
The constitutional framework preserves his autonomy against the will of the majority,
and his freedom to act on his own vision of the good defines liberal constitutionalism's
central value. For democrats, the capacity of individuals to reflect on their own interests
and on the public good, and then to act in concert to govern themselves, provides the
foundation for legitimate state action. The political participation of free and equal citi-
zens signifies continuing consent to the power of majorities-consent upon which state
power depends.
Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1657, 1664-65 (1997) (footnotes
omitted).
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into the rhetoric of individual rights as a means of subordinating those
rights to specific social imperatives.102
Hence, as MacKinnon notes, it is presumed that privacy and
therefore autonomy, currently constructed as protection from the
state, protects women's autonomy or women's freedom to choose;
but in reality, privacy, as currently constructed, works to preserve the
status quo of women's inequality and subordination. However, there
is at least one other possibility. Privacy does not have to safeguard
women's inequality. Instead, privacy can be understood as a positive
state obligation to ensure women's equal citizenship. Privacy can be
understood as an affirmative obligation on the part of the state to
protect the underlying conditions that make full citizenship possi-
ble.103 SusanJames notes:
Within the liberal tradition, certain kinds of dependence have long
been recognized as hindrances to political participation. First, in order
to speak in their own voices, citizens must be physically independent, free
from bodily violation or the threat of it. Second, citizens are not in a po-
sition to express their political views if by doing so they run the risk of
losing the means to provide for themselves and their dependants, the risk
of either destitution or slavery. These freedoms are traditionally secured
by individual rights to life, liberty and property, rights which are in turn
interpreted in the light of the demand that the citizen should have the
securit% or independence to contribute to the polity in his or her own
voice.
Certainly, the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to re-
quire that equality be fostered and protected in order to secure these
same requirements of citizenship.' 0 As James notes, "independent
citizens are not found but made, forged out of a collection of elabo-
rate social arrangements designed to provide certain kinds of secu-
102 MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 187 (quoting Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 233, 236 (1977)).
10S ProfessorJed Rubenfeld suggests that privacy should also encompass prohibiting the state
from imposing a state-supported identity on its citizens by enforcing social norms. Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989) (stating that the right of pri-
vacy is the "freedom not to have one's life too totally determined by ... [the] state"); see also id.
at 794 (discussing how the right of privacy should "prevent[] the state from imposing on indi-
viduals a defined identity").
I James, supra note 95, at 50.
1o5 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (finding that separate
educational facilities that "deprive children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities" are unconstitutional because of the importance of education in state and local
governments).
[Vol. 6:4
NONCONSENSUAL MEDICAL TREATMENT
rity," such as the secret ballot, which allowed men to participate in
governance without fear of physical or economic retaliation.
0 6
As previously noted, however, autonomy as traditionally conceived
has been used to exclude women from equal citizenship. Women's
social and economic dependence on men and the lack of social ar-
rangements designed to protect the security of women's voices have
made autonomy for women illusory in at least two different ways.
First, with regard to dependency, women have been socially and eco-
nomically dependent in our culture. As such, they have been con-
trolled by their social roles as mothers and nurturers of children and
men. Thus, they are not understood as appropriately autonomous,
and are not regarded as proper citizens. Many feminists have recog-
nized these limitations of the traditional understanding of auton-
omy.' 7 As Young notes: "Attentive love disqualifies the nurturers of
the individuality and autonomy of citizens and from the exercise of
citizenship.., because the character of mothers tends to be emo-
tional and oriented to particular needs and interests instead of to the
general good."'0 8
The second force that has constrained women's autonomy is the
absence of social and legal mechanisms that ensure women's ability
to speak in their own voices. For example, women have not been
treated as individuals, but rather as parts of families, where their roles
as reproducers and nurturers have been their only value. Because
families have not been thought of as a proper inquiry for law, eco-
nomics, or other public institutions, women have suffered violence
that restricts their participation in politics and economics. Familial
violence, for which women have had little if any legal recourse, con-
stricts women's abilities to contribute, using their own voices, without
the threat of physical harm. Hence, wife beating and the lack of an
appropriate legal response to ensure women's safety is one example
of how social and legal mechanisms that ensure women's autonomy
have not been well developed in liberal politics. We are just begin-
ning to develop such mechanisms. Professor MacKinnon eloquently
describes this slow change in women's status from an appropriate re-
ceptor of private/familial violence to equal citizen, and the difficul-
ties faced. MacKinnon argues:
One way to describe the process of change in women's legal status
from chattel to citizen is as a process of leaving home. The closer to
106 James, supra note 95, at 51.
107 See YOUNG, supra note 94, at 124; Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources,
Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 7, 9 (1989) (referencing the feminist argument
that "women are not seen and defined as themselves, but in their relations to others ... as
someone's wife or mother").
108 YOUNG, supra note 94, at 124.
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home women's injuries are addressed, the less power and fewer rights
they seem to have; the further away from home the forum, the more
power and rights women have gained-and with them freedom of action,
resources, and access to a larger world. In experiential terms, women are
least equal at home, in private; they have had the most equality in public,
far from home. It is in the private, man's sovereign castle, where most
women remain for a lifetime, where women are most likely to be battered
and sexually assaulted, and where they have no recourse because the pri-
vate, by definition, is inviolable and recourse means intervention.... As
a result of such balances that men with power strike among themselves,
represented in the shape of public institutions, men have the most free-
dom at home, and women gain correspondingly greater equality, hence
freedom, the further away from home they go.
Nevertheless, if autonomy is the ability to "make choices about
one's life and to act on those choices without having to obey others,
meet their conditions, or fear their threats and punishments," ° and
the ability to live by one's own law,"' then it can be made available to
women. Women can be liberated from male violence in private and
in public if autonomy can be liberated from its traditional liberal
meaning of governmental noninterference. In order for autonomy
to have real significance in women's lives, the state must have dual
obligations: to be noncoercive (instead of noninterference) and to
assert an affirmative obligation to secure conditions that promote
autonomous, noncoercive decision making." 2  Within the liberal
state, such reconstruction is not merely reformist, it is revolutionary.
It demonstrates the potential for the liberation of autonomy from
109 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114
HARv. L. REV. 135, 174-75 (2000); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIALJUsTICE 63-64
(1999) (criticizing the tendency of liberal thinkers to "segment the private from the public
sphere, considering the public sphere to be the sphere of individual rights and contractual ar-
rangements, the family to be a private sphere.., into which the state should not meddle").
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Casey in some ways took note of these issues. O'Connor
seemed to understand the women could not act autonomously in the face of familial violence.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893-94 (1991) (finding the spousal notification
provision at issue unconstitutional as an undue burden on the pregnant woman's right to abor-
tion, in part on account of the prevalence of domestic violence).
11 YOUNG, supra note 94, at 125-26.
I See Nedelsky, supra note 107, at 34 (arguing that the role of the state in a democracy is to
ensure that the state does not act in ways that undermine its citizens' autonomy described as
their "capacity to find and live by their own law").
11 Of course this is why decisional autonomy (spoken about in the language of "privacy")
has been so problematic for feminists. As Elizabeth Schneider notes, the articulation of
women's right to procreate in the language of privacy "reinforces and legitimizes the public and
private dichotomy which historically has been damaging to women. For women, the domestic
sphere and sexuality-primary areas of subordination-have been viewed as private and un-
regulated." Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 638 (1986); see also MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 193-
94 ("[A] right to that privacy isolates women at once from each other and from public re-
course.").
[Vol. 6:4
NONCONSENSUAL MEDICAL TREATMENT
traditional patriarchal norms. Within this restructured meaning,
autonomy can, and should, take into account the social construction
of individuals, and the social constraints on their choices. Indeed,
the feminist reconstruction of autonomy takes into account that "so-
cial conditions not only limit the ability of individuals to act upon
their own vision of the good but also define the very content of that
vision."' 3 By liberating autonomy from its traditional liberal confines,
we see that it can be understood in ways that are potentially freeing
for women.
In order to complete autonomy's liberation from traditional pa-
triarchal norms, and to advance women's citizenship, women's deci-
sional privacy has to be secured by the force of law. It is not enough
that it is simply protected by governmental noninterference, fed by
liberal assumptions that the only obligations of the state toward
women are negative in nature. 4 Nor can this be accomplished, as
liberals often suggest with respect to women, by ignoring difference
or by suggesting that difference is irrelevant to political equality (and
hence citizenship). Liberals quite clearly comprehend that, at least
with respect to race, difference is not irrelevant to political equality,
and that some may need to be treated differently than others to se-
cure a minimal level of autonomy in order to allow them to partici-
pate in the political and economic life of the nation. For example,
liberals support affirmative action mechanisms that treat people of
color differently in order to secure for people of color a minimal
level of political and economic security, which permits them to par-
ticipate as citizens. 15 Some citizens, like people of color, are selected
for special treatment in some contexts because the effects of their dif-
ferences (or the effects of inequality) can only be eased by treating
them differently. As James notes: "There is thus a sense in which lib-
eral theory takes account of difference, not as something that is po-
11S Higgins, supra note 101, at 1665.
114 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding the constitutionality of the
Hyde Amendment, which prohibited the use of federal funds to pay for medically necessary
abortions for poor women).
"5 Susan James gives the example of this argument with respect to women as mothers. She
explains:
[M]others should be awarded a family allowance to compensate them for the loss of
their economic independence while they bear and bring up children. To put the point
another way, exponents of this liberal view recognize that the difference between moth-
ers and others jeopardizes the economic independence of mothers, and holds that the
state should intervene to guarantee that their independence is preserved.
James, supra note 95, at 52; see also Carole Pateman, Equality, Difference, Subordination: The Politics
of Motherhood and Women's Citizenship, in BEYOND EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE 17, 17-31 (Gisela
Bock & Susan James eds., 1992) (discussing the challenges feminists face when attempting to
reconcile notions of women as equal with notions of women as different).
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litically valuable in itself, but as something that is politically relevant
because it threatens the equal independence of citizens.""
6
Justice Blackmun has long understood the connection between
forced pregnancy and equal citizenship for women. Indeed, in his
concurrence in Casey, he makes the first mention of this connection
in Supreme Court jurisprudence. He argues that restrictions on
abortion, not just the lack of legal abortion, amount to forced preg-
nancy, and as a result many of the restrictions at issue in Casey violate
the constitutional requirement of gender equality. He states:
A State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy
also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality. State restric-
tions on abortion compel women to continue pregnancies they otherwise
might terminate. By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the
State conscripts women's bodies into its service, forcing women to con-
tinue their pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in most in-
stances, provide years of maternal care. The State does not compensate
women for their services; instead, it assumes that they owe this duty as a
matter of course. This assumption-that women can simply be forced to
accept the "natural" status and incidents of motherhood-appears to rest
upon a conception of women's role that has triggered the protection of
the Equal Protection Clause. The joint opinion recognizes that these as-
sumptions about women's place in society "are no longer consistent with
our understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution.""'
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg has also noted that women's equality
and equal citizenship demands that women's decisional privacy be re-
spected in pregnancy-related decision making. In describing the
Court's holding in Roe, Justice Ginsberg commented:
The conflict, however, is not simply one between a fetus' interests and a
woman's interests, narrowly conceived, nor is the overriding issue state
versus private control of a woman's body for a span of nine months. Also
in the balance is a woman's autonomous charge of her full life's
course... her ability to stand in relation to man, society, and the state as
an independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen."'
CONCLUSION: SECURING WOMEN'S AUTONOMY IN THE CONTEXT OF
PREGNANCY-RELATED DECISION MAKING: FORCED MEDICAL
TREATMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AUTONOMY
The constitutional rights to privacy and bodily integrity should
protect women's access to abortion and pregnancy-related decision
making. As articulated by the Court, these rights are individual rights
16 James, supra note 95, at 52.
117 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 853, 928-29 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
11 Ruth Bader Ginsberg, supra note 7, at 383 (footnote omitted).
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that in most circumstances simply protect a woman's right to choose
abortion or to choose to continue her pregnancy. But viewed
through the lens of compelled medical treatment of pregnant
women, the right to privacy can be understood as something more
substantial. If what is being protected by privacy is the right to deci-
sional autonomy, then perhaps privacy is not simply a negative
right-the right to be left alone to make up your mind in private. If
understood as decisional autonomy, then the notion of privacy ex-
pands to include an affirmative state obligation to ensure that
women, regardless of whether they are pregnant, get to make deci-
sions regarding health care autonomously, not without context, but
without familial or state coercion. ' 19 If autonomy is a necessary predi-
cate for citizenship, and women have a right to full citizenship, then
the state has an expanded obligation. The state then has the obliga-
tion to insure conditions under which women are able to act inde-
pendently and autonomously, and to speak in their own voices with-
out fear of physical or economic reprisals. Women should not have
to "leave home," in MacKinnon's words, in order for the state to un-
derstand its obligation.12 ° By protecting women's decisional autonomy
(here in the context of health care decision making) with the force of
law, the state can help to secure women's access to a fuller citizen-
ship.
119 Even the Supreme Court seems to understand the ways in which the "private family" can
coerce women into making particular choices. For example, in Casey, the Court in ajoint opin-
ion written by Justice O'Connor, clearly understands some of the ways in which domestic vio-
lence can eviscerate women's autonomy. Casey, 505 U.S. at 893-94 (stating that the prevalence
of domestic violence in women's lives is one reason that the spousal notification provision of
the statute is deemed unduly burdensome and hence unconstitutional). What the Court com-
pletely ignores is the way in which state coercion works to destroy women's decision-making
authority. One example of this is the plethora of state restrictions on abortion that are permis-
sible. Not only does the state have no affirmative obligations to pay for the abortions of poor
women, but after the Court's pronouncement in Casey, states may restrict abortion by prescrib-
ing waiting periods, "informed consent" stipulations meant to change women's minds about
abortion, and by requiring parental consent for minors. All of these restrictions make abortion
harder to access, particularly for poor women, and these restrictions exist where the state pays
for and supports sterilizations for the same women who are thwarted by lack of funding, not
only for abortion, but also for family planning. These regulations are constructed in such a way
as to punish poor women for engaging in sexual activity. Having no meaningful options pun-
ishes them. Because of the regulations, poor women are left with two "choices": either abstain
from sexual intercourse, the mainstay of sexual activity for heterosexual women, or "choose"
surgical sterilization. Consequently, for many of these women, the only "decision" that can be
made in order to avoid unplanned pregnancies is sterilization, a decision that is not made
autonomously but rather coerced by the state.
120 MacKinnon, supra note 109, at 174-75.
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